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Summary 
Empirical research on civil war onset has been largely dominated by two approaches: 
a correlational or “correlates of civil war” approach which seeks to identify country-
level characteristics that are associated with a higher likelihood of civil war outbreak; 
and a bargaining approach which starts from the assumption that warfare is costly and 
which views civil conflict as a by-product of bargaining failures. Yet, correlational 
and bargaining studies of internal conflict onset have reached an analytical plateau 
because they fail to specify the precise mechanisms that yield civil warfare instead of 
a different type of violent or nonviolent outcome. This article advances an alternative, 
contentious framework for studying civil war onset which situates the conflict event 
within a larger cycle of contention and which specifies the mechanisms through 
which civil conflict is most likely to occur. According to this contentious perspective, 
civil wars are commonly produced by the combination of one structural condition – a 
state crisis of authority and/or legitimacy – and the interdependent effect of two 
mechanisms – radicalization and militarization. Through theory development and 
vignettes from a handful of civil war cases, the article makes the case that the 
contentious approach holds promise for elucidating how exactly civil conflicts might 
break out. Despite holding initial explanatory power, the contentious theory of civil 
war onset advanced herein awaits more systematic empirical testing. 
 
Keywords: bargaining theories of war; civil war; contentious politics; correlates of 
civil war; empirical international relations theory; mechanisms; violence 
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Introduction 
Civil wars are conventionally viewed as instances of coordinated, sustained violence 
between political organizations that are subject to a common authority at the outset of 
hostilities (Kalyvas, 2005; Levy and Thompson, 2011). According to this widely 
accepted definition, civil war encompasses coordinated, sustained violence between a 
government and a rebel organization or between two or more insurgent groups. Civil 
wars are the most common forms of conflict in the post-1945 environment. Although 
relatively rare occurrences compared to the number of peace-years, civil wars can be 
particularly destructive: they take lives and tear apart communities, destroy physical 
infrastructure and human capital, arrest socio-economic development, and leave 
behind indelible marks on collective psyches.  
If they are so devastating, why do civil wars break out? This article examines 
the evolution of empirical research on the causes of internal conflict onset. Particular 
attention is given to two dominant approaches to internal conflict outbreak: a 
correlational approach, originating in the early 1970s, which comprised a first wave 
of empirical civil war research and which sought to identify country-level 
characteristics that tend to be associated with a greater likelihood of observing civil 
war onset; and a bargaining approach, originating in the late 1990s, which represented 
a second wave of empirical civil war research and which focused on the strategic 
interaction between disputants and viewed internal conflict outbreak as a product of 
bargaining failures. The purpose of this article is not to review the main findings in 
the vast civil war research program,1 but, rather, to discuss major contributions and 
limitations of these two dominant empirical approaches to internal conflict. In light of 
the shortcomings that beset these frameworks, the article proposed an alternative, 
contentious approach that may provide a fuller understanding of the processes through 
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which civil wars break out.    
  
The Correlational Approach to Civil War Onset 
The first wave of empirical work on civil war onset focused, almost exclusively, on 
the structural conditions that make countries more prone to experiencing civil war or, 
more precisely, on those factors that allow domestic opponents to overcome collective 
action problems and mobilize against internal rivals (Olson, 1965). Rather than 
engage in complex theorizing of actors’ strategic interactions and of the dynamic 
processes through which internal conflict might ensue, this first wave of empirical 
research looked at civil warfare through a static, correlational lens. The “correlates of 
civil war” wave gained visibility and prominence as a mirror image of the “correlates 
of war” approach which examined the conditions associated with the outbreak of 
interstate war and which, by the early 1990s, came to dominate much of the empirical 
work on international conflict. At the beginning, the “correlates of civil war” 
literature was fairly amorphous, but it soon came to be dominated by two broad 
classes of explanations: grievance-based explanations and greed-based explanations. 
Grievance-based accounts (Gurr 1970) focused on background conditions or 
government actions, such as repression, discrimination, poverty, income inequality, 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization, that create grievances at the individual or group 
level and galvanize collective action. Greed-based frameworks concentrated on 
rebels’ opportunity costs for engaging in violence (Collier, Hoeffler, and Roehner, 
2009; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Adherents of this 
approach typically examined factors that encouraged rebel predatory behavior, such 
as the presence of lootable mineral resources and the existence of an oil dependent 
economy, or conditions that favor or make insurgency more feasible, like state 
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weakness, rough terrain, external support from other countries or ethnic diasporas, 
recent outbursts of civil conflict or political instability, large population, state age 
(newness of a state), or regime type (a common argument posited that the risk of civil 
war breakout would be higher in anocracies, transitioning regimes that display both 
authoritarian and democratic characteristics). Although they relied on various datasets 
and statistical models, the “correlates of civil war” studies produced a “near 
consensus that poverty, large populations, a low level of economic development, a 
prior history of civil war, and political instability increase a country’s risk of civil 
war. There is also some evidence that a dependence on natural resources, the 
existence of ethnic diasporas, concentrated populations, rough terrain, and anocracies 
are positively associated with the outbreak of civil war” (Walter, 2009, p. 244).   
 The “correlates of civil war” literature sought to uncover variables 
consistently linked with civil war rather than advance unified theories of internal 
conflict onset. As a consequence, it suffered from a litany of shortcomings: the 
theoretical connections between certain country-level characteristics, such as income 
inequality, and civil conflict were not so clear-cut (Blattman and Miguel, 2010); a 
cacophony of ad-hoc theoretical explanations were advanced to account for 
correlational patterns gleaned from the data; power and survival as primary 
motivations for armed group behavior were given insufficient treatment (Vinci, 
2006); time-invariant covariates, such as GDP/capita, could not adequately explain 
the variability in civil war onsets (Young, 2013); the root (underlying) and proximate 
causes of civil war were not easily detectable (Blattman and Miguel, 2010); outcomes 
were over-determined – too many mechanisms were proposed to account for 
statistical patterns; empirical tests did not always distinguish between rival theoretical 
explanations; measurement problems were abundant; endogeneity was pervasive but 
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not properly addressed; interaction effects were insufficiently explored; most such 
studies had trouble explaining the variation in civil war outbreak across countries that 
shared similar characteristics (Walter, 2009). Overall, the first wave of empirical 
studies on civil war onset provided a fairly opaque view of how exactly internal 
conflicts emerge because they paid little attention to how rebel organizations coalesce 
and splinter, how they interact with the government, other insurgents, or third parties, 
or how this interaction unfolds to produce varying violent or nonviolent outcomes. 
 
The Bargaining Approach to Civil War Onset 
The second wave of empirically based theories of civil war onset was dominated by 
rationalist accounts which regarded conflict as an outcome of bargaining failures. 
Given the dearth of complex theorizing in the “correlates of war” literature, 
bargaining theories of conflict were enthusiastically embraced by internal conflict 
scholars because they managed to address at least some of the problems plaguing 
correlational studies. Bargaining approaches view civil war as a puzzle: given the 
existence of less costly alternatives to settling disputes, why do actors resort to violent 
costly behaviour? As a subset of rationalist accounts for war, bargaining approaches 
envisioned conflict as a by-product of three factors: informational asymmetries, 
credible commitment, and issue indivisibilities (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2002; Reiter, 
2003). Initially developed to explain international conflict, the bargaining logic was 
quickly applied to civil wars, especially to ethnic conflicts (Walter, 1997, 2002, 
2009). Bargaining accounts for civil war onset start from the assumption that war is 
costly and that domestic opponents should prefer a settlement that offers them exactly 
what they would obtain at the end of hostilities. As with international rivals, the 
problem is that three recurrent conditions make that type of settlement unlikely. One 
	 7 
such condition is information asymmetry – a situation where actors hold private 
information about their military capability and determination to fight against their 
enemies. Private information is “knowledge an actor possesses that is not available to 
the other” (Lake, 2003, p. 83). Information asymmetries occur because opponents 
have rational incentives to misrepresent information about capabilities and resolve. 
Walter (2009, p. 246) holds that informational asymmetries are particularly acute in 
civil war situations for at least two reasons: first, because rebels operate clandestinely, 
governments often have trouble monitoring their capabilities and strategies; second, 
because insurgents are generally weaker than the government, they have strong 
incentives to misrepresent their military prowess and determination to fight in order to 
bolster their bargaining leverage. 
 Bargaining theories suggest that, even in those situations where informational 
asymmetries may not be severe, war could still break out because antagonists cannot 
credibly commit to abide by an agreement. Problems of commitment tend to arise 
with expected shifts in the relative power distribution between disputants and with 
divisions within the organizational structure of each actor – veto players with a say 
over government policy and radical factions within an insurgency may oppose a 
proposed settlement and continue fighting (Cunningham, 2011). Commitment issues 
tend to be severe in internal conflicts because expected shifts in the power distribution 
in governments’ favor following negotiated settlements that generally provide for 
insurgent demobilization offer incentives for these governments to renege on 
promises. As Walter (2009) points out, “governments can offer to reform the political 
process, share power, or transfer autonomy to competitors, but these weaker 
competitors will have little ability to penalize a government should it fail to follow 
through” (p. 246). Finally, a third bargaining explanation for war onset relates to the 
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type of issue under dispute. Certain issues, such as control over territory, may be 
indivisible in that they cannot be split among opponents (the prototypical example 
mentioned in the bargaining literature is the status of Jerusalem). Issue indivisibilities 
may arise because of inherent properties of the issue under dispute (Hassner, 2009) or 
because of actors’ inability to commit to a certain distribution of the disputed good 
(Goddard, 2009). Hence, in the latter case, issue indivisibility emerges as a 
consequence of bargaining failures, not a cause thereof. 
 Overall, bargaining models offer a more realistic view of the processes that 
might lead to inefficient behavior and civil war. By focusing on the strategic 
interaction between adversaries they better capture the dynamic character of internal 
conflict onset. Bargaining frameworks mark an important departure from the static 
correlational studies that merely identified state-level characteristics associated with a 
higher likelihood of civil warfare. While also taking into account structural 
conditions, bargaining approaches privilege, and rightly so, actors’ agency – 
especially when the unitary actor assumption is abandoned in favor of the more 
realistic view of actors comprising of multiple subgroups or factions with divergent 
preferences and interests. Although they provide a better understanding of internal 
conflict dynamics compared to the largely atheoretical “correlates of civil war” 
approaches, bargaining frameworks suffer themselves from several shortcomings. For 
instance, they do yield falsifiable predictions, “but few articulate the precise empirical 
tests that would distinguish among alternative mechanisms” (Blattman and Miguel, 
2010, p. 17). Also, the ability of empirical methods to test a bargaining model 
“appears fundamentally limited because of the high information demands of the most 
direct tests of the bargaining model” (Reiter, 2003, p. 37). Further, these models do 
not clearly distinguish between types of bargaining failures that produce civil warfare 
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from the types of bargaining failures that produce different kinds of violent or 
nonviolent outcomes. The remainder of this article discusses some areas where the 
explanatory power of bargaining frameworks is limited, and advances an alternative 
approach to studying civil war onset that may address at least some of the 
shortcomings plaguing the still dominant bargaining accounts for civil conflict. 
 
Pitfalls of Bargaining Explanations for Civil War Onset 
Bargaining accounts of internal conflict have limited explanatory power in those 
circumstances where there is little, if any, strategic bargaining or interaction between 
rivals prior to the outbreak of violence. Consider the onset of civil war in Libya 
(2011) in the aftermath of Arab Spring protests that were sweeping the larger Middle 
East and North African (MENA) region. In this case, bargaining between the regime 
of Muammar Gaddafi and the various militias comprising the Libyan insurgency was 
limited or, some would argue, virtually inexistent. Rather than an outcome of 
bargaining failure, the war seems to have been produced by a situation where the 
antagonists, the rebels and the regime, had rational incentives to fight: both the 
insurgents and the government were confident that they would prevail militarily and, 
as a consequence, did not make any effort to prevent the onset of hostilities. In a 
conventional bargaining scenario, one would have expected to see the Libyan regime 
and rebel leaders devoting significant effort to “put serious offers on the table – offers 
that have a positive probability of being accepted” (Fearon, 2013, p. 2). Instead, on 
the eve of the Libyan civil war, neither side advanced any serious offer for a 
negotiated settlement. As Fearon (2013, p. 3) notes, the position adopted by the 
antagonists seems to have been: “Let’s just fight for a while to see if we can win 
outright, or demonstrate that we must ultimately be given better terms.”  If anything, 
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the internal conflict that broke out in Libya in the wake of the Arab Spring revealed 
an initial preference for fighting instead of bargaining.  
Actors’ preference for fighting that was visible in the case of the Libyan civil 
conflict poses an important challenge to the war inefficiency assumption that 
underpins bargaining explanations for warfare. The main theoretical premise 
underlying bargaining, and, more generally, rationalist accounts for conflict is that 
war imposes large costs on all actors involved in the dispute relative to an alternative 
peaceful outcome. From this vantage point, war is thought to be inefficient in that 
there always exists an ex ante bargain that avoids the costs of conflict and leaves all 
parties better off. The problem is, according to scholars operating within the 
rationalist tradition, that informational asymmetries, credible commitment problems, 
and issues of indivisibility prevent opponents from reaching an ex ante deal that gives 
them exactly what they would have obtained at the end of the conflict but that would 
have allowed them to avoid the costs of war (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 2002; Walter, 
2009). The circumstances that preceded the outbreak of the Libyan civil war depart 
from the assumption that war was perceived to be inherently costly or inefficient by 
the government and the rebels. Clearly, the Gadhafi regime and its opponents 
expected a higher utility from warfare than from peace. If some actors, as was the 
case in Libya, do indeed display an affinity for conflict, then the costly war edifice on 
which conventional rationalist theories are built begins to unravel. Libya is not an 
isolated case where actors’ behavior might suggest a preference for war. In fact, the 
range of circumstances where strategic actors might regard war as less costly than the 
peace alternative is larger. Coe (2012), for example, identifies three common sources 
of costs in peace: predation (extraction of tribute by one actor from another); 
imposition (imposition of punitive measures, such as sanctions, by one actor upon 
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another); arming (“costly attempts to shift the balance of power”).  Coe (2012) argues 
that predation explains the American War of Independence, imposition explains the 
outbreak of civil warfare after the end of the Gulf War, and arming explains the Iraq 
War. Coe’s work offers a welcome corrective to standard rationalist analyses of 
conflict because it suggests that, in some circumstances, outcomes other than war – 
predation, imposition, arming, proxy conflicts, restrictions on foreign investment – 
can be equally, if not more, costly. In his view, “all these things are the result of 
underlying commitment problems and asymmetric information of varying severity, 
and they are all partial substitutes for each other; war occurs only when it is the most 
cost-effective option. So, the mechanisms for bargaining failure that rationalist 
scholars thought were explanations for war are only partially so – we also need to 
know why war was chosen over other costly behaviors” (Coe, 2012, p. 6). This 
argument has important theoretical and empirical implications: if the range of actors’ 
costly actions goes well beyond war, then standard bargaining frameworks are 
internally inconsistent and empirically inconclusive. The internal inconsistency stems 
from the inability of existing theories to explain why bargaining failures produce war 
rather than a different type of outcome. The empirical inconclusiveness derives from 
the type of data conventionally used to test the theoretical expectations produced by 
bargaining models of war. If bargaining failures can yield outcomes other than war, 
the empirical tests that do not include these possible outcomes are biased and, thus, 
largely inaccurate. 
 This problem is particularly salient in studies of civil war where the range of 
possible outcomes that result from bargaining failures can be quite extensive. 
Bargaining breakdown between domestic actors can generate various violent or non-
violent forms of contention: demonstrations, genocides, politicides, revolutions, 
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uprisings, purges, rebellions, riots, strikes, protests, acts of civil disobedience, non-
violent resistance, or other forms of social and political disorder. Civil wars rarely 
break out in a contentious vacuum; rather, internal conflict is typically embedded in 
larger cycles of domestic contention that often display violent and non-violent 
manifestations of unrest (Tarrow, 2007; Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). For example, the 
ongoing Syrian civil war (2011—) erupted in the midst of a cycle of contention that 
began in March 2011 with peaceful manifestations inspired by the Arab Spring 
revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. The minor power-sharing concessions offered by 
the Assad regime did not placate the opposition; as a result, peaceful protests quickly 
diffused across much of the country. What began as nonviolent anti-government 
mutiny quickly morphed into violent regime repression, radicalization of opposition 
demands, and insurgent military mobilization, primarily along sectarian lines. In a 
matter of months, the country plunged into a protracted and violent civil war that 
shows no signs of abating. The factors that precipitated the outbreak of internal 
conflict in Syria cannot be fully grasped if we analyze it in isolation from other forms 
of contention – nonviolent protest, government repression, insurgent violence – that 
preceded it. Conventional bargaining accounts provide incomplete answers to the civil 
war puzzle in Syria because they fail to specify which types of bargaining failures 
produced the different types of outcomes – nonviolent protest, government repression, 
insurgent violence, civil war outbreak – across the entire cycle of contention that 
started with the Arab Spring-inspired demonstrations. Stating that a particular type of 
outcome occurred because bargaining between actors failed is theoretically 
indeterminate. For bargaining frameworks to carry satisfactory explanatory power in 
analyses of internal conflicts, they need to specify the precise mechanisms that 
produced civil warfare rather than other types of outcomes across the broader 
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contentious cycle in which the conflict event is embedded. Put otherwise, bargaining 
accounts of civil war alone are incomplete; explanations of other violent or nonviolent 
forms of contention that predated the onset of internal conflict are also necessary.  
 Situating civil warfare in a larger framework of contentious events has 
important theoretical and empirical implications. Theoretically, if internal conflict is 
embedded in a broader cycle of contention that displays various types of collective 
action at different stages, then a unified bargaining framework may abstract too much 
away from the processes that produce the outcome of interest. Bargaining theories 
help illuminate civil war onset only inasmuch as they are also able to elucidate other 
types of events that can be observed within a given contentious cycle. A contentious 
politics angle de-exceptionalizes civil war and locates it within a larger repertoire of 
collective action (della Porta 2013, p. 15; Rule, 1988, p. 170). To argue that 
bargaining failures led to civil war, it behooves the analyst to explain the processes 
through which bargaining failures might have produced different forms of violent or 
nonviolent collective action before the eruption of the conflict. In other words, the 
observable implications of bargaining theories need to traced along the entire 
contentious cycle, not only cross-sectionally at the point of civil war onset. For 
instance, a comprehensive bargaining account of the breakout of violence in Syria 
needs to explain not only why the collapse of bargaining between the government and 
the opposition led to violence, but also why bargaining failures produced other types 
of contentious outcomes that preceded the eruption of hostilities. More generally, we 
still lack theoretically consistent answers to two key questions: What kind of 
bargaining failures are more likely to produce civil conflict than other types of 
contentious events? Under what circumstances might similar bargaining problems 
produce different contentious outcomes? 
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 Looking at civil war through a contentious lens has empirical consequences as 
well, especially for large-N analyses of internal conflict onset. If one starts from the 
theoretical premise that civil war is embedded in a wider cycle of contention that 
includes multiple stages at which the strategic interaction between actors may yield 
varying violent and non-violent outcomes (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Demirel-
Pegg, 2014), then the conventional units of analysis – the state-year, the conflict-year, 
or the dyad-year – are no longer appropriate. Dominant, bargaining-centered studies 
of civil war suffer from a severe selection bias because they typically exclude not 
only instances of non-violent mobilization (Kalyvas, 2006, 32) but also episodes 
where bargaining failures produced forms of contention other than warfare, such as 
opposition purges, pogroms, or civilian riots that are observable across multiple cases 
like the ones in Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan (1992) or Tamil Eelam (1983) in Sri 
Lanka. In both of these instances, civil war emerged out of an escalatory process of 
contention that started with inter-ethnic pogroms in Sumgait and Baku in the former 
case, and with a Sinhalese riot that led to the destruction of the Jaffna Library in 
Tamil Eelam in the latter case (DeVotta, 2004; de Waal, 2003). The point about 
including acts of violent and non-violent collective action in models of civil war onset 
is not theoretically or empirically trivial since the same mechanisms posited to have 
produced civil war in existing bargaining theories could also be related to cognate 
phenomena that are not properly observed and measured and, thus, routinely excluded 
from model specifications. Even in the absence of proper theorizing on civil war as an 
outcome of a contentious process that displays various forms of violent or non-violent 
collective action, large-N bargaining studies – which typically rely on civil war data 
from the Correlates of War (COW) or UCDP/PRIO – should at the very least include 
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other types of contentious events that occurred during the analytical timeframe in 
order to guard against the bias inherent in selecting only on the civil war outcome. 
 
A Contentious Politics Approach to Civil War Onset 
If civil war is viewed as an emergent phenomenon situated within a complex process 
of political contention, then the processual, dynamic nature of internal conflict onset 
might be better captured if one adopts the cycle of contention or the contentious spell 
as the unit of analysis. Cycles of contention/contentious spells encapsulate the whole 
range of violent and non-violent forms of collective action that occur within a 
bounded timeframe (Tarrow, 2011, 2012; Tilly, 2001). In the social movements 
literature, a cycle of contention describes a “phase of heightened conflict across the 
social system, with rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less 
mobilized sectors and [with] a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention 
employed” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 199). How exactly can one capture contentious cycles 
empirically? A cycle of contention can be operationalized as a succession of 
“interrelated collective actions and reactions to them whose aggregate frequency, 
intensity, and forms increase and then decline in rough chronological proximity” 
(Tarrow, 2012, p. 134). The observable indicator of the beginning of a contentious 
cycle would be the occurrence of organized collective action either by the government 
or by a nonstate actor. On the regime side, such organized collective action could take 
the form of repression, for instance. On the opposition side, organized collective 
action could initially manifest itself in the form of protests or riots that may or may 
not escalate to violence, for example. The end of a cycle of contention/contentious 
spell would be empirically marked by government victory, rebel victory, peace 
agreement, or the lack of nonviolent or violent forms of contention for a certain 
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period of time. Contentious cycles can be observed at the country level, where one 
would trace violent and nonviolent forms of contention within the respective country 
for a given timeframe demarcated by the onset and termination of mobilization. 
Cycles of contention can also be tracked at the dyadic level, where one would observe 
a government-nonstate actor dyad, or a nonstate actor-nonstate actor dyad throughout 
all stages of the mobilization process.   
 By locating civil warfare within cycles of contention, one can better ascertain 
how civil wars might escalate from various types of violent or nonviolent contention 
or how they may later mutate into other contentious phenomena (Cunningham and 
Lemke, 2014). Della Porta notes that actor competition tends to intensify during 
contentious cycles, “as social movement organizations multiply and then split over 
the best strategies to adopt, some of them choosing more radical ones” (della Porta 
2013, p. 75). Placing civil warfare within larger cycles of contention places the 
analyst in an ideal position to explore the mechanisms that connect the different 
stages of the cycle. 
 
Contention, Mechanisms, and Civil War 
The idea of embedding internal conflict within contentious cycles implies that civil 
war onset is a process rather than a one-shot event that occurs in isolation from the 
broader context in which actors interact. This perspective bears resemblance to the 
Tillyan political process approach, which envisages mobilization as an outcome that 
emerges gradually out of actors’ contentious interactions (Tilly, 1978). Looking at the 
contentious cycle/spell as the unit of analysis can afford a firmer grip on the 
mechanisms that generate civil war outbreak. Mechanisms “refer to intermediary 
steps between conditions and outcomes” (della Porta, 2013, p. 24). According to 
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Hedström and Ylikovski (2010, p. 54), mechanisms are central to causal inferences: 
“the knowledge that there is a mechanism through which X influences Y supports the 
inference that X is a cause of Y.” For example, poverty – a consistent predictor of 
civil war onset in correlational studies – does not in and of itself cause internal 
conflict; “it is mechanisms that provide the link” (Ron, 2005, p. 444). Conversely, 
“the absence of a plausible mechanism linking X to Y gives us a good reason to be 
suspicious of the relation being a causal one” (ibid.). 
Some argue that a mechanism-centered approach is necessary for future 
progress on civil war research (Checkel 2013, p. 24). Indeed, a fuller understanding of 
internal war onset implies knowing not only whether certain factors are associated 
with a higher likelihood of observing civil warfare, but also how exactly these factors 
operate to produce the outcome. “Correlates of civil war” and bargaining-centered 
explanations remain incomplete without a specification of mechanisms that describe 
how independent variables are connected to the pathways through which internal 
conflict breaks out. Mere associations between variables conceal an empty shell of 
causation because they do not tell a compelling story about why covariations run in 
certain directions rather than others (Gerring, 2010, 1502). As Bennett (2013) notes, a 
focus on causal mechanisms does incur an important cost – the loss of parsimony – 
but this might be necessary for grasping the complexity of civil warfare. After all, “a 
mechanism is an irreducibly causal notion. It refers to the entities of a causal process 
that produces the effect of interest” (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, p. 50). Hence, a 
mechanism-based approach to civil initiation is likely to offer a more realistic view of 
the causal processes that can lead to internal conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; 
Checkel, 2013). 
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 A mechanism is the connective fabric between variables of interest (Tarrow, 
2011, p. 186), the pathway or process by which an outcome is produced (Gerring, 
2010, p. 1501). According to Tilly (2001), mechanisms “form a delimited class of 
events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely 
similar ways over a variety of situations” (p. 25). A mechanism is ontologically 
distinct from a variable – unlike variables, mechanisms are not properties of the units 
of analysis. Rather, “they reside above and outside the units in question and describe 
the relationship between the units of analysis” (Falleti and Lynch, 2009, p. 147). 
Causal mechanisms are rarely observable in the literal sense of the term (Gerring, 
2007, 245). They are “portable concepts that explain how and why a hypothesized 
cause, in a given context, contributes to a particular outcome” (Falleti and Lynch, 
2009, p. 1144). From this vantage point, causation is inextricably linked to 
mechanisms: to argue that X causes Y means not only to find an association between 
X and Y but also to explicate the process through which changes in X induce changes 
in Y in a particular direction. Additionally, an analytically useful mechanism is one 
that “must be general enough to be portable across different contexts but may produce 
different results in analytically nonequivalent contexts; mechanisms alone cannot 
cause outcomes. Rather, causation resides in the interaction between the mechanism 
and the context in which it operates” (Falleti and Lynch, 2009, p. 1146). Thus, a 
“mechanistic” view of causation implies theorizing about both the process through 
which X affects Y as well as the context in which such process unfolds.  
 Mechanisms are frequently invoked by political scientists, sociologists, and 
economists alike in their attempt to elucidate various phenomena. In traditional 
economy theory, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” of supply and demand market forces 
is the quintessential mechanism that ensures an efficient level of production, 
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consumption, and distribution of goods. Hirschman (1970) argues that two 
widespread mechanisms affect the fate of inefficient organizations, regardless of 
whether they are firms or states: “exit” and “voice.” Members of declining 
organizations have two options to address organizational inefficiency: they can select 
“exit” and leave the organization in favor of a better alternative or they can choose 
“voice” and attempt to alter the operation of the polity. “Exit” and “voice” are not 
independent of one another; rather, they operate in tandem. As Hirschman (1970) 
himself states “the actual level of voice feeds on [the] lack of opportunity to exit” (p. 
34). A “threshold” mechanism lies at the core of many sociological accounts for 
social mobilization. For example, Granovetter (1978) notes that sustained collective 
action requires the participation of critical number of participants – a “threshold” – 
that signals to other potential participants that the risks of engaging in collective 
behavior are acceptable. Once a protest threshold is reached, the rate of participation 
tends to increases dramatically as more individuals will fall in line if they see a large 
number of protestors joining in at high rates. Kuran (1989) dwells on Granovetter’s 
“threshold” mechanism to explain the individual rate of participation in the East-
European communist revolutions of 1989. He advances the idea that authoritarian 
regime disapproval is not sufficient for mobilizing large numbers of people for 
collective action against the government. In repressive regimes, collective action is 
hampered by a high threshold for personal participation in collective action. However, 
after a critical mass of participants manage to sustain collective action for longer 
periods of time, dissatisfied individuals are highly likely to join the protest. As Kuran 
puts it, in the context of the 1989 revolutions, sustained collective action from a 
critical mass of protestors was the “spark” that set alight the revolutionary “prairie 
fire.” Another landmark study that relies on the “threshold” logic to explain 
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mobilization for collective action is Rasler (1996) who investigates the escalation of 
popular mobilization in the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution. Her main argument is that 
government’s inconsistent use of both accommodation and repression lowered the 
threshold for participation in collective action by wide segments of the population 
(Rasler, 1996, p. 144). Because of inconsistent government policies of repression and 
concessions, dissent intensified both across segments of the population and across 
regions (through a spatial diffusion effect) which eventually led to the overthrow of 
the Iranian Shah in February 1979. 
 The main virtue of a mechanism-based approach to civil war resides in the 
ability to illuminate the processes through which covariations occur – mechanisms tell 
the “story” behind the association between variables. Although mechanisms display 
latent explanatory properties (i.e. they can explain how variation in X produces 
variation in Y), they are not panacea for comprehensive causal accounts. Mechanisms 
are “not some sort of magic bullet for causal inference” (Hedström and Ylikoski, 
2010, p. 54). Gerring (2010) argues that a mechanism-based approach to social 
behavior can suffer on several accounts. One is that “specifying a causal mechanism 
is sometimes a highly speculative affair. The posited mechanism may be highly 
specific but at the same time remain entirely unproven, and perhaps highly dubious. 
This is what prompts some partisans of causal mechanisms to insist that mechanisms 
not only be specified but also tested empirically wherever their veracity is in doubt” 
(Gerring, 2010, p. 1505). The important question is, then, whether mechanisms can be 
really tested. How does one test a “story”? Gerring (2010, pp. 1499-1511) states that 
empirical tests of mechanisms are indeed desirable “but often unrealistic” because for 
the same association between X and Y, one can find a “litany of theoretically 
plausible mechanisms.” Another problem posed by a mechanism-based approach is 
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that concepts underlying a mechanism are sometimes vague and, thus, hard to 
operationalize. They “either resist measurement or are liable to many plausible 
indicators” (Gerring, 2010, p. 1510). While X and Y are likely to be observable and 
measurable, the territory between X and Y, by contrast, “is often a morass” (Gerring, 
2010, p. 1517). A third challenge is that, as discussed above, the same mechanism can 
have varying effects on an outcome depending on the context in which it operates 
(Gerring, 2010, p. 1511). In these situations, it would be impossible to “say anything 
definitive about the causal mechanisms at work, unless one has correctly identified 
the circumstances in which X is positively, or negatively, associated with Y” 
(Gerring, 2010, p. 1511).  
These shortcomings notwithstanding, tracing the mechanisms through which 
civil war emerges within contentious cycles is likely to provide greater analytical 
purchase than static correlational analyses or theoretically indeterminate bargaining 
frameworks. The next section lays out an alternative, mechanism-based framework 
for studying civil war onset. The framework suggests that many instances of internal 
conflict outburst display an underlying or structural condition – a crisis of authority 
and/or legitimacy – and two interdependent mechanisms that may produce sustained, 
organized violence – radicalization and militarization. Radicalization signals a 
change towards more extreme actor tactics while militarization marks a commitment 
towards the adoption of more violent forms of contention.2 Radicalization and 
militarization can mark two shifts: 1) the shift from loosely coordinated contentious 
action towards organized rebellion where actors systematically use violence in pursuit 
of their strategic goals; or 2) the shift from coordinated collective action that employs 
nonviolence to organized rebellion that relies on violence as its main tactic. 
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A Mechanism-Based Framework for Civil War Onset 
A common pathway through which civil warfare breaks out within a given 
contentious cycle/spell involves the presence of a state crisis of authority and/or 
legitimacy and the escalation of actor interactions through two interlinked 
mechanisms: radicalization and militarization (see Figure 1).3  
 
Crisis of authority and/or legitimacy (structural condition) 
 
Radicalization (mechanism) 
 
Militarization  (mechanism) 
 
 Civil war outbreak (outcome) 
Figure 1: A common process leading to civil war outbreak 
 
A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for civil war outbreak is the existence of a 
crisis of state authority and/or legitimacy. This is the underlying or structural 
characteristic that marks the beginning of a contentious cycle/spell and functions as 
the sine qua non of many, if not most, civil wars. Crises of authority and/or 
legitimacy appear when there are multiple power contenders who challenge the 
sovereign actor (the central government) and undermine its functions. When crises of 
authority and/or legitimacy occur, we are dealing with a fragmented body politic in 
which challengers constantly try to undercut each other’s strategies using nonviolent 
or violent means. This internal competition may “arise from ideological conflict, from 
competition for space in a static organizational sphere, or from personal conflicts for 
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power between leaders” (della Porta, 2013, p. 79). During such crises, parallel 
structures emerge that rival or seek to replace the sovereign government as the sole 
purveyor of authority. Essentially, crises of authority and/or legitimacy are commonly 
associated with a declining capacity of governments to perform key functions of 
sovereign statehood (violence monopoly; extraction; redistribution). These types of 
crises can arise in various situations, but are more prevalent in authoritarian regimes, 
in newly formed or weak states, in ethnically diverse societies, or in the aftermath of 
imperial or federal collapse.  
In the contentious politics literature, a state authority/legitimacy crisis 
provides the political opportunity structure for organized collective action (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001). Political opportunity structures emerge in the presence of 
factors that enhance (or inhibit) prospects for mobilization (Meyer and Minkoff, 
2004). Political opportunity structures obtain when exogenous or endogenous 
conditions open up the space for violent or nonviolent contention among domestic 
actors. If we look closely at the theoretical assemblage on civil war onset, we cannot 
help but notice that existing theories, especially the “correlates of civil war” 
approaches, overwhelmingly focus on the political opportunity structure phase of the 
civil war contentious cycle/spell – in other words, they mainly elucidate why a crisis 
of authority and/or legitimacy appears in the first place.  
The state-level characteristics examined in “correlates of civil war” studies 
help illuminate the circumstances when crises of authority/legitimacy are most likely 
to emerge rather than when civil war is most likely to break out. Although the 
“correlates of civil war” literature is large and fairly diverse, it typically focuses on 
recurrent state-level variables that can be clustered in a handful of categories (Dixon, 
2009): demographic variables (e.g., ethno-linguistic fractionalization; religious 
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diversity/polarization; population density; minority concentration); geographic-
environmental variables (e.g., topographic characteristics, environmental degradation; 
region; neighborhood); natural resource variables (e.g., oil; diamonds; other lootable 
resources); socio-economic variables (e.g., GDP growth; trade; investment; income 
inequality; literacy rate; mortality rate; exclusion; discrimination); political variables 
(e.g., regime type; conflict history; rivalry; new state). Many of these covariates have 
been shown to be systematically linked to civil war. Does that mean that they are 
causally connected to internal conflict onset? Skeptics would dispute this assertion on 
both theoretical and methodological grounds. As mentioned above, “correlates of civil 
war” works suffer from multiple shortcomings: predictors of civil war are largely 
static or slow-moving; proxies for concepts such as minority grievances are rather 
crude; the mechanisms that link state-level attributes to civil war outcomes are poorly 
specified; many findings are contradictory; the mechanisms linking state-level 
attributes to civil war outcomes are poorly specified; the statistically significant 
correlational patterns gleaned from these studies often come out as artifacts of 
measurement and modelling choices. More substantially, though, if we perceive civil 
warfare as an outcome of a contentious process that begins with a crisis of 
authority/legitimacy, the state-level features that are purported to explain the outbreak 
of internal conflict only account for when we are most likely to observe an 
authority/legitimacy crisis in the first place.4 Thus, they are able to elucidate only the 
initial stage of the larger contentious process that may or may not escalate to civil 
warfare. Exploration of the mechanisms that eventually lead to internal conflict 
cannot be satisfactorily achieved with these frameworks. 
An example that illustrates these problems is the civil war in Nagorno-
Karabakh, an Armenian-controlled enclave of Azerbaijan that has functioned 
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independently of Baku since 1992. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict broke out in the 
midst of a cauldron of domestic instability precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the mobilization of rival ethnic communities (King, 2009). Right after 
declaring independence in December 1991, the newly formed Azerbaijani state 
suffered from mutually reinforcing crises of authority and legitimacy. In the chaos 
that followed the unravelling of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan emerged as a weak new 
state that, in the initial stage, scrambled to amass a military that would be effectively 
deployed to enforce a violence monopoly over its sovereign territory. This happened 
at a nebulous time when central government’s authority was challenged by Armenian 
irregulars who had already begun to carve areas of exclusive rule in Nagorno-
Karabakh and its surroundings. At the moment of its (re)birth in 1991,5 Azerbaijan 
also suffered from a severe legitimacy deficit: it was a poor country in transition that 
displayed inchoate political institutions which were poorly equipped to absorb dissent 
or offer credible guarantees for protecting the rights of the territorially concentrated 
Armenian minority (Toft, 2003).  
Some may argue that civil war outbreak in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s falls 
squarely in line with prevailing theoretical expectations in “correlates of civil war” 
studies. After all, in this body of literature, factors that seem to have contributed to 
civil war onset in Nagorno-Karabakh – new state embroiled in regime transition; poor 
and weak country; concentrated minority that lacks credible security guarantees; 
mountainous terrain that facilitates rebellion – feature prominently as robust 
predictors of conflict outbreak (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Nonetheless, one should 
avoid falling into the trap of post-hoc rationalizations. The civil war outcome in 
Nagorno-Karabakh was not foreordained, but originated in an environment of acute 
authority and legitimacy crisis wherein processes of radicalization and militarization 
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rapidly escalated into violence. Civil war did indeed break out in the background of a 
legitimacy and authority crisis, but only after the opponents radicalized their demands 
to the point where compromise became unrealistic and a security dilemma led to a 
spiral of militarization.  
In the absence of radicalization and militarization, crises of authority and/or 
legitimacy may not generate civil warfare but, instead, may produce different types of 
outcomes along the contentious cycle. For example, strikingly similar conditions to 
the ones in Azerbaijan were present in Sri Lanka when the country gained 
independence in 1948: newly formed, poor, weak, transitional state dominated by a 
Sinhala majority that could not credibly commit to offer legal protections to the Tamil 
minority concentrated in the northeast of the island; discriminatory policies against 
minorities; rough, jungle terrain that favored insurgency. Yet, civil war did not 
immediately break out. Instead, in the Sri Lankan case, we observe various types of 
outcomes along the contentious cycle that began with a crisis of authority and 
legitimacy upon the country’s independence in 1948 and that culminated in civil war 
onset towards the end of 1983: exclusion of Tamils from the civil service, academic, 
and military sectors; non-violent protests and acts of civil disobedience organized by 
Tamil groups; violent repression by government forces against Tamil protestors 
(Ramaswamy, 2007). Civil war onset happened only in the context of radicalization 
and militarization that had engulfed the country by early 1980s. Beyond the examples 
of Azerbaijan and Sri Lanka, it is abundantly clear that a crisis of authority and/or 
legitimacy is a necessary, but certainly not sufficient, condition for observing internal 
conflict onset. In the contemporary period (post-1945), many countries have suffered 
from some kind of authority or legitimacy crisis; yet, civil warfare has been a 
relatively rare occurrence. This understanding of radicalization and militarization as 
	 27 
key mechanisms leading to civil war onset lies close to della Porta’s conceptualization 
of mechanisms as “chains of interaction that filter structural conditions and produce 
effects” (della Porta, 2013, p. 24). Therefore, a mechanism-based approach to internal 
conflict outbreak pays attention to both structure and agency. Civil war is an emergent 
phenomenon in a process where actors’ agency constantly interacts with structural 
characteristics of the environment in which they operate. To elucidate civil war onset, 
it is not sufficient to explain when a crisis of authority and/or legitimacy is most likely 
to obtain; it is also necessary to examine the ways in which radicalization and 
militarization combine to produce an escalatory spiral that results in organized 
collective violence between the government and insurgents or among rebels 
themselves. 
State-level “correlates of civil war” approaches can help us understand why 
collective action obstacles to social mobilization can be overcome and why crises of 
state authority and /or legitimacy may occur, but have a hard time explaining when 
we are most likely to observe radicalization and militarization producing civil 
warfare. In their turn, by capturing the strategic interaction between actors at the 
dyadic level, bargaining frameworks can integrate more effectively those factors (for 
example, divisions within the government and/or the rebel movement; external 
military support for the state or the rebellion; third-party interventions) that are 
typically associated with the radicalization and militarization mechanisms. Yet, 
bargaining theories do not clearly specify whether radicalization and militarization 
occur because of informational asymmetries, commitment problems, or issue 
indivisibilities, or whether radicalization and militarization create or exacerbate 
informational asymmetries, problems of commitment (Jenne, 2007), and issue 
indivisibilities (Goddard, 2009; Hassner, 2009). Hence, these frameworks remain 
	 28 
theoretically opaque: their underlying logic produces empirically indeterminate 
expectations. Particularly problematic remains their inability to specify why different 
kinds of bargaining failures produce different types of violent or nonviolent 
contentious outcomes or why similar kinds of bargaining failures generate various 
forms of violent or nonviolent contentious outcomes within a given cycle of 
contention. 
The focus on radicalization and militarization within mechanism-centered 
frameworks allows us to see how actor interactions transition from nonviolence to 
violence or from low levels of violence to high levels of violence. Nonetheless, this 
analytical task is complicated by conventional conceptualizations of civil war in the 
empirical literature which may obscure or conflate various forms of violent contention 
with internal conflict (Florea, 2012; Lake, 2003). Current empirical studies typically 
embrace the UCDP/PRIO definition of conflict as a “contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two 
parties of which at least one is the government of a state results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths” (Melander, Pettersson, and Themner, 2016).6 The casualty-based 
conceptualization is methodologically appealing since it provides the consistency 
needed for large-N analysis (Canestaro, 2016). However, the rationale for including 
arbitrary violence thresholds as observable indicators of war quickly withers away if 
civil war onset is examined within a broader contentious cycle that displays diverse 
manifestations of violent or nonviolent collective action. The casualty-based threshold 
raises important theoretical and analytical concerns. Was violence targeting minority 
Armenians in Sumgait (February 1988) and Baku (January 1990) a pogrom, civil war, 
or something else? What distinguishes civil warfare from other forms of domestic 
organized violence that produce 25+ or 1000+ “battle-related deaths”? The casualty-
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based conceptualization strips away the dynamic nature of civil conflict because it 
prevents us from empirically capturing the wide variation in the types of violent and 
nonviolent forms of collective action within a given contentious cycle/spell. If the 
casualty threshold is retained at the most reliable criterion by which civil wars are 
identified, it would be quite difficult to accurately track the key escalatory 
mechanisms of radicalization and militarization along a contentious cycle/spell 
because various forms of violent collective action may be artificially bundled under 
the general category of civil warfare where, in fact, they may capture violent 
phenomena other than civil war. Therefore, violence and civil war need to be 
analytically decoupled: civil warfare is best conceptualized independently of the level 
of violence (Florea, 2012; Kalyvas, 2006). 
Embracing a contentious politics, mechanism-based approach to internal 
conflict onset yields several theoretical and methodological payoffs. Theoretically, 
such a perspective affords a better understanding of the steps or processes that might 
lead to civil war outbreak. A contentious view on civil war outbreak allows the 
analyst to unpack the pathways through which less intense forms of domestic strife 
might escalate to internal conflict and to ascertain the variation in the types of violent 
and nonviolent outcomes resulting from actors’ interactions. As suggested herein, a 
common pathway through which countries become embroiled in civil warfare 
involves the existence of a crisis of authority and/or legitimacy as an underlying 
condition and two subsequent, interconnected mechanisms, actor radicalization and 
the militarization of the dispute.7 This combination creates a dynamic that is most 
likely to bring about internal conflict. Methodologically, embedding civil war in a 
larger repertoire of domestic contention entails adopting the contentious cycle/spell as 
the unit of analysis. This has important implications for data collection practices since 
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theories of civil war onset, duration, and termination will need to be tested on the 
whole range of nonviolent and violent forms of collective action observed within a 
given contentious cycle/spell.8 While more labor-intensive, this alternative approach 
to civil war data collection and analysis will likely alleviate concerns about unit 
homogeneity that plague existing practices (current civil war codings, especially those 
in the UCDP/PRIO dataset, may actually capture forms of violent collective action 
that are different from civil warfare). 
 
Conclusion 
Civil war is not an independent event that occurs in isolation, but an outcome of a 
process of political contention that commonly displays various forms of violent and 
nonviolent collective action. To gain a fuller understanding of how civil warfare may 
grow out the interaction between a government and an armed nonstate challenger, or 
from the interaction between two or more armed nonstate challengers, it needs to be 
empirically investigated within a contentious cycle/spell. One common pathway that 
leads to civil onset involves the presence of a crisis of state authority and/or 
legitimacy (an underlying or structural cause of internal conflict outbreak) and the 
interplay of two mechanisms (proximate causes of civil war onset), actor 
radicalization and militarization of the political contest, which may be visible at 
different stages in the contentious cycle/spell. Examining internal conflict outbreak 
within a contentious ecosystem allows the analyst to trace how civil war may emerge 
from the escalation of militarized or non-militarized interactions between domestic 
adversaries. By viewing civil war as part of a larger process and not as a one-shot 
event, scholars can better trace the range of actors’ behavioral repertoires in a given 
contentious cycle/spell.  
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 A contentious approach to civil warfare integrates important insights from the 
literature on social movements and political mobilization, provides a more realistic 
picture of how internal conflict actually breaks out, and addresses important 
limitations in the correlational and bargaining studies that have tended to dominate 
existing empirical research. Such an approach allows the investigator to focus on the 
process that produces civil war, not just on the event itself. At the same time, placing 
civil warfare within a contentious framework requires a substantial rethink of our 
theories and methodologies.9 Theoretically, the precise steps through which the 
mechanisms of radicalization and militarization interact to produce civil warfare, as 
opposed to a different form of political contention, still need to be elucidated. 
Methodologically, the next task for scholars of internal conflict and violence is to 
look at the cycle of contention as the unit of analysis and explore empirically the 
strategic and nonstrategic factors that influence the violent or nonviolent outcomes 
observed at each stage in the cycle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 32 
References: 
 
Bennett, A. (2013). Causal Mechanisms and Typological Theories in the Study of 
Civil Conflict. In Checkel T.J. (Ed.). Transnational Dynamics of Civil War 
(pp. 205-230). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010). Civil War. Journal of Economic Literature, 48, 3-
57. 
 
Canestaro, N. (2016). Towards a Practitioner-Centric Definition of Civil War. Civil 
Wars, 18, 359-377. 
 
Checkel, J. T. (Ed.). (2013). Transnational Dynamics of Civil War. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M.J. (2011). Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic 
Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
 
Coe, A. J. (2012). Economic Origins of War and Peace (Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation). Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Roehner, D. (2009). Beyond Greed and Grievance: 
Feasibility and Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers, 61, 1-27.  
 
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 56, 563-595. 
 
Cunningham, D.E. (2011). Barriers to Peace in Civil War. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press.   
 
Cunningham, D.E., & Lemke, D. (2014). Beyond Civil Wars: A Quantitative 
Examination of Causes of Violence within Countries. Civil Wars, 16, 328-345. 
	 33 
 
della Porta, D. (2013). Clandestine Political Violence. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Demirel-Pegg, T. (2014). From the Streets to the Mountains: The Dynamics of 
Transition from a Protest Wave to an Insurgency in Kashmir. Mobilization, 
19, 309-327. 
 
DeVotta, N. (2004). Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and 
Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
De Waal, T. (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. 
New York, NY: New York University Press. 
 
Dixon, J. (2009). What Causes Civil War? Integrating Quantitative Research 
Findings. International Studies Review, 11, 707-735. 
 
Falleti, T.G., & Lynch, J.F. (2009). Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political 
Analysis. Comparative Political Studies, 42, 1143-1166. 
 
Fearon, J.D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization, 
49, 379-414. 
 
Fearon, J.D., & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American 
Political Science Review, 97, 75-90. 
 
Florea, A. (2012). Where Do We Go From Here? Conceptual, Theoretical, and 
Methodological Gaps in the Large-N Civil War Research Program. 
International Studies Review, 14, 78-98. 
 
Gerring, J. (2010). Causal Mechanisms: Yes, But…Comparative Political Studies, 43, 
1499-1526. 
 
Gerring, J. (2007). Is There a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method? Comparative Political 
	 34 
Studies, 40, 231-253. 
 
Gibler, D. (forthcoming). Combining Behavioral and Structural Predictors of Violent 
Civil Conflict: Getting Scholars and Policymakers to Talk to Each Other. 
Forthcoming in International Studies Quarterly. 
 
Goddard, S.E. (2009). Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. American Journal 
of Sociology, 83, 1420-1443. 
 
Gurr, T.R. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hassner, R.E. (2009). War on Sacred Grounds. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Hedström, P. & Ylikoski, P. (2010). Social Mechanisms in the Social Sciences, 
Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 49-67. 
 
Hironaka, A. (2005). Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, 
and the Perpetuation of Civil War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Hirschman, A.O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Jenne, E.K. (2007). Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Kalyvas, S.N. (2006). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Kalyvas, S.N. (2007). Civil Wars. In Boix, C. & Stokes, S. (Eds.). The Oxford 
	 35 
Handbook of Comparative Politics (pp. 416-434). New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
King, C. (2009). The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Kuran, T. (1989). Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political 
Revolution. Public Choice, 61, 41-74. 
 
Lake, D.A. (2003). International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights 
from the Interstices. International Studies Review, 5, 81-89.  
 
Levy, J.S., & Thompson, W.R. (2011). The Arc of War: Origins, Escalation, and 
Transformation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of Contention. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Melander, E., Pettersson, T, & Themner, L. (2016). Organized Violence, 1989-2015. 
Journal of Peace Research, 53, 727-742. 
 
Meyer, D.S., & Minkoff, D.C. (2004). Conceptualizing Political Opportunity. Social 
Forces, 82, 1457-1492. 
 
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Powell, R. (2002). Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. Annual Review of 
Political Science, 5, 1-30. 
 
Ramaswamy, V. (2007). Historical Dictionary of the Tamils. Lanham, MD: 
Scarecrow Press. 
 
Rasler, K. (1996). Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian 
	 36 
Revolution. American Sociological Review, 61, 132-152. 
 
Reiter, D. (2003). Exploring the Bargaining Model of War. Perspectives on Politics, 
1, 27-43. 
 
Ron, J. (2005). Paradigm in Distress? Primary Commodities and Civil War. Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 49, 443-450. 
 
Sambanis, N. (2004). What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of 
an Operational Definition. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48, 814-858. 
 
Senese, P.D., & Vasquez, J.A. (2007). The Steps to War: An Empirical Analysis. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Tarrow, S. (2012). Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious 
Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tarrow, S. (2011). Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics 
(3rd ed.) New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tarrow, S. (2007). Inside Insurgencies. Politics and Violence in an Age of Civil War. 
Perspectives on Politics, 5, 587-600. 
 
Tilly, C. (2001). Mechanisms in Political Processes. Annual Review of Political 
Science, 4, 21-41. 
 
Tilly, C. (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2007). Contentious Politics. Boulder, CO: Paradigm 
Publishers. 
 
Toft, M.D. (2003). The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the 
	 37 
Indivisibility of Territory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Vinci, A. (2006). Greed-Grievance Reconsidered: The Role of Power and Survival in 
the Motivation of Armed Groups. Civil Wars, 8, 25-45. 
 
Walter, B.F. (1997). The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. International 
Organization, 51, 335-364. 
 
Walter, B.F. (2002). Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil War. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Walter, B.F. (2009). Bargaining Failures and Civil War. Annual Review of Political 
Science, 12, 243-261. 
 
Wood, E.J. (2008). The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation 
of Social Networks. Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 539-561. 
 
Young, J.K. (2013). Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil War. Political 
Research Quarterly, 66, 516-532. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 38 
Notes 																																																								
1 For such reviews, see, inter alia, Blattman and Miguel (2010), Dixon (2009), 
Sambanis (2004), and Walter (2009). 
2 Tarrow (2011, p. 207) holds that radicalization marks a shift in social movement 
organizations towards “the extremes and/or the adoption of more disruptive forms of 
contention.” Wood (2008, p. 550) conceptualizes militarization as “the supplanting of 
local forms of governance with new forms that reflect the influence of armed actors.” 
3 Obviously, this process is probabilistic, not deterministic. Internal conflicts may 
emerge through alternative pathways; however, the contentious cycle described here 
captures the event sequence that is most likely to produce civil war outbreak. 
4 As Gibler aptly suggests, these factors routinely associated with civil conflict “may 
be a product of structural conditions and not at all associated with the conflicts 
themselves” (Gibler, forthcoming, p. 1). 
5 Azerbaijan was an independent country from 1918 until 1920 when it was 
incorporated into the Soviet Union. 
6 The Correlates of War (COW) dataset requires a much larger casualty threshold to 
code for the presence of war: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. 
7 This processual view of civil war onset bears some resemblance to the “steps-to-
war” theory in which territorial issues are the underlying causes of interstate war, and 
practices of power politics, such as militarization through alliance making and 
military buildup, are its proximate causes (Senese and Vasquez, 2007). 
8 Cases currently coded as civil war recurrence may actually capture the variation in 
violence within the same contentious cycle (Florea, 2012; Hironaka, 2005). 
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9 One recent study that embraces a process-based view of civil war is Young (2013). 
Young views internal conflict onset as an outcome of an escalatory process which 
sees high levels of state repression and opposition dissent. 
